File
Blob: src/workerd/api/crypto/ec.c++
| 1 | // Copyright (c) 2017-2022 Cloudflare, Inc. |
| 2 | // Licensed under the Apache 2.0 license found in the LICENSE file or at: |
| 3 | // https://opensource.org/licenses/Apache-2.0 |
| 4 | |
| 5 | #include "ec.h" |
| 6 | |
| 7 | #include "impl.h" |
| 8 | #include "keys.h" |
| 9 | |
| 10 | #include <workerd/api/util.h> |
| 11 | #include <workerd/io/features.h> |
| 12 | |
| 13 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
| 14 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> |
| 15 | #include <openssl/curve25519.h> |
| 16 | #include <openssl/ec_key.h> |
| 17 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| 18 | |
| 19 | #include <kj/function.h> |
| 20 | |
| 21 | #include <map> |
| 22 | #include <type_traits> |
| 23 | |
| 24 | namespace workerd::api { |
| 25 | |
| 26 | Ec::Ec(EC_KEY* key): key(key), x(OSSL_NEW(BIGNUM)), y(OSSL_NEW(BIGNUM)) { |
| 27 | KJ_ASSERT(key != nullptr); |
| 28 | group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key); |
| 29 | JSG_REQUIRE( |
| 30 | 1 == EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, getPublicKey(), x.get(), y.get(), nullptr), |
| 31 | InternalDOMOperationError, "Error getting affine coordinates for export", |
| 32 | internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 33 | } |
| 34 | |
| 35 | int Ec::getCurveName() const { |
| 36 | return EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group); |
| 37 | } |
| 38 | |
| 39 | uint32_t Ec::getDegree() const { |
| 40 | return EC_GROUP_get_degree(getGroup()); |
| 41 | } |
| 42 | |
| 43 | const EC_POINT* Ec::getPublicKey() const { |
| 44 | return EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key); |
| 45 | } |
| 46 | |
| 47 | const BIGNUM* Ec::getPrivateKey() const { |
| 48 | return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key); |
| 49 | } |
| 50 | |
| 51 | SubtleCrypto::JsonWebKey Ec::toJwk(KeyType keyType, kj::StringPtr curveName) const { |
| 52 | JSG_REQUIRE(group != nullptr, DOMOperationError, "No elliptic curve group in this key", |
| 53 | tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 54 | JSG_REQUIRE(getPublicKey() != nullptr, DOMOperationError, |
| 55 | "No public elliptic curve key data in this key", tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 56 | |
| 57 | auto groupDegreeInBytes = integerCeilDivision(getDegree(), 8u); |
| 58 | // EC_GROUP_get_degree returns number of bits. We need this because x, y, & d need to match the |
| 59 | // group degree according to JWK. |
| 60 | |
| 61 | SubtleCrypto::JsonWebKey jwk; |
| 62 | jwk.kty = kj::str("EC"); |
| 63 | jwk.crv = kj::str(curveName); |
| 64 | |
| 65 | static constexpr auto handleBn = [](const BIGNUM& bn, size_t size) { |
| 66 | return JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL(bignumToArrayPadded(bn, size), InternalDOMOperationError, |
| 67 | "Error converting EC affine co-ordinates to padded array", internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 68 | }; |
| 69 | |
| 70 | auto xa = handleBn(*x, groupDegreeInBytes); |
| 71 | auto ya = handleBn(*y, groupDegreeInBytes); |
| 72 | |
| 73 | jwk.x = fastEncodeBase64Url(xa); |
| 74 | jwk.y = fastEncodeBase64Url(ya); |
| 75 | |
| 76 | if (keyType == KeyType::PRIVATE) { |
| 77 | const auto privateKey = getPrivateKey(); |
| 78 | JSG_REQUIRE(privateKey != nullptr, InternalDOMOperationError, |
| 79 | "Error getting private key material for JSON Web Key export", |
| 80 | internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 81 | auto pk = handleBn(*privateKey, groupDegreeInBytes); |
| 82 | jwk.d = fastEncodeBase64Url(pk); |
| 83 | } |
| 84 | return jwk; |
| 85 | } |
| 86 | |
| 87 | jsg::JsArrayBuffer Ec::getRawPublicKey(jsg::Lock& js) const { |
| 88 | JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL(group, InternalDOMOperationError, "No elliptic curve group in this key", |
| 89 | tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 90 | auto publicKey = getPublicKey(); |
| 91 | JSG_REQUIRE(publicKey != nullptr, InternalDOMOperationError, |
| 92 | "No public elliptic curve key data in this key", tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 93 | |
| 94 | // Serialize the public key as an uncompressed point in X9.62 form. |
| 95 | uint8_t* raw; |
| 96 | // The caller takes ownership of the buffer and, unless the buffer was fixed with CBB_init_fixed, |
| 97 | // must call OPENSSL_free when done. |
| 98 | // https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-boringssl-docs/bytestring.h.html#CBB_finish |
| 99 | KJ_DEFER(if (raw != nullptr) { OPENSSL_free(raw); }); |
| 100 | size_t raw_len; |
| 101 | CBB cbb; |
| 102 | |
| 103 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == CBB_init(&cbb, 0), InternalDOMOperationError, "Failed to init CBB", |
| 104 | internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 105 | KJ_DEFER(CBB_cleanup(&cbb)); |
| 106 | |
| 107 | JSG_REQUIRE( |
| 108 | 1 == EC_POINT_point2cbb(&cbb, group, publicKey, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, nullptr), |
| 109 | InternalDOMOperationError, "Failed to convert to serialize EC key", |
| 110 | internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 111 | |
| 112 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == CBB_finish(&cbb, &raw, &raw_len), InternalDOMOperationError, |
| 113 | "Failed to finish CBB", internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 114 | |
| 115 | return jsg::JsArrayBuffer::create(js, kj::arrayPtr(raw, raw_len)); |
| 116 | } |
| 117 | |
| 118 | CryptoKey::AsymmetricKeyDetails Ec::getAsymmetricKeyDetail(jsg::Lock& js) const { |
| 119 | // Adapted from Node.js' GetEcKeyDetail |
| 120 | return CryptoKey::AsymmetricKeyDetails{ |
| 121 | .namedCurve = kj::str(OBJ_nid2sn(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))}; |
| 122 | } |
| 123 | |
| 124 | kj::Maybe<Ec> Ec::tryGetEc(const EVP_PKEY* key) { |
| 125 | int type = EVP_PKEY_id(key); |
| 126 | if (type != EVP_PKEY_EC) return kj::none; |
| 127 | auto ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(key); |
| 128 | if (ec == nullptr) return kj::none; |
| 129 | return Ec(ec); |
| 130 | } |
| 131 | |
| 132 | // ===================================================================================== |
| 133 | // ECDSA & ECDH |
| 134 | |
| 135 | namespace { |
| 136 | |
| 137 | class EllipticKey final: public AsymmetricKeyCryptoKeyImpl { |
| 138 | public: |
| 139 | explicit EllipticKey(AsymmetricKeyData keyData, |
| 140 | CryptoKey::EllipticKeyAlgorithm keyAlgorithm, |
| 141 | uint rsSize, |
| 142 | bool extractable) |
| 143 | : AsymmetricKeyCryptoKeyImpl(kj::mv(keyData), extractable), |
| 144 | keyAlgorithm(kj::mv(keyAlgorithm)), |
| 145 | rsSize(rsSize) {} |
| 146 | |
| 147 | CryptoKey::AlgorithmVariant getAlgorithm(jsg::Lock& js) const override { |
| 148 | return keyAlgorithm; |
| 149 | } |
| 150 | kj::StringPtr getAlgorithmName() const override { |
| 151 | return keyAlgorithm.name; |
| 152 | } |
| 153 | |
| 154 | void requireSigningAbility() const { |
| 155 | // This assert is internal to our WebCrypto implementation because we share the AsymmetricKey |
| 156 | // implementation between ECDH & ECDSA (the former only supports deriveBits/deriveKey, not |
| 157 | // signing which is the usage for this function). |
| 158 | JSG_REQUIRE(keyAlgorithm.name == "ECDSA", DOMNotSupportedError, |
| 159 | "The sign and verify operations are not implemented for \"", keyAlgorithm.name, "\"."); |
| 160 | } |
| 161 | |
| 162 | kj::StringPtr chooseHash( |
| 163 | const kj::Maybe<kj::OneOf<kj::String, SubtleCrypto::HashAlgorithm>>& callTimeHash) |
| 164 | const override { |
| 165 | requireSigningAbility(); |
| 166 | |
| 167 | // ECDSA infamously expects the hash to be specified at call time. |
| 168 | // See: https://github.com/w3c/webcrypto/issues/111 |
| 169 | return api::getAlgorithmName(JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL(callTimeHash, TypeError, |
| 170 | "Missing \"hash\" in AlgorithmIdentifier. (ECDSA requires that the hash algorithm be " |
| 171 | "specified at call time rather than on the key. This differs from other WebCrypto " |
| 172 | "algorithms for historical reasons.)")); |
| 173 | } |
| 174 | |
| 175 | jsg::JsArrayBuffer deriveBits(jsg::Lock& js, |
| 176 | SubtleCrypto::DeriveKeyAlgorithm&& algorithm, |
| 177 | kj::Maybe<uint32_t> resultBitLength) const override final { |
| 178 | JSG_REQUIRE(keyAlgorithm.name == "ECDH", DOMNotSupportedError, |
| 179 | "" |
| 180 | "The deriveBits operation is not implemented for \"", |
| 181 | keyAlgorithm.name, "\"."); |
| 182 | |
| 183 | JSG_REQUIRE(getTypeEnum() == KeyType::PRIVATE, DOMInvalidAccessError, |
| 184 | "" |
| 185 | "The deriveBits operation is only valid for a private key, not \"", |
| 186 | getType(), "\"."); |
| 187 | |
| 188 | auto& publicKey = JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL( |
| 189 | algorithm.$public, TypeError, "Missing field \"public\" in \"derivedKeyParams\"."); |
| 190 | |
| 191 | JSG_REQUIRE(publicKey->getType() == "public"_kj, DOMInvalidAccessError, |
| 192 | "" |
| 193 | "The provided key has type \"", |
| 194 | publicKey->getType(), "\", not \"public\""); |
| 195 | |
| 196 | JSG_REQUIRE(getAlgorithm(js).which() == publicKey->getAlgorithm(js).which(), |
| 197 | DOMInvalidAccessError, "Base ", getAlgorithmName(), |
| 198 | " private key cannot be used to derive" |
| 199 | " a key from a peer ", |
| 200 | publicKey->getAlgorithmName(), " public key"); |
| 201 | |
| 202 | JSG_REQUIRE(getAlgorithmName() == publicKey->getAlgorithmName(), DOMInvalidAccessError, |
| 203 | "Private key for derivation is using \"", getAlgorithmName(), |
| 204 | "\" while public key is using \"", publicKey->getAlgorithmName(), "\"."); |
| 205 | |
| 206 | auto publicCurve = |
| 207 | publicKey->getAlgorithm(js).get<CryptoKey::EllipticKeyAlgorithm>().namedCurve; |
| 208 | JSG_REQUIRE(keyAlgorithm.namedCurve == publicCurve, DOMInvalidAccessError, |
| 209 | "Private key for derivation is using curve \"", keyAlgorithm.namedCurve, |
| 210 | "\" while public key is using \"", publicCurve, "\"."); |
| 211 | |
| 212 | // The check above for the algorithm `which` equality ensures that the impl can be downcast to |
| 213 | // EllipticKey (assuming we don't accidentally create a class that doesn't inherit this one that |
| 214 | // for some reason returns an EllipticKey). |
| 215 | auto& publicKeyImpl = kj::downcast<EllipticKey>(*publicKey->impl); |
| 216 | |
| 217 | // Adapted from https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Elliptic_Curve_Diffie_Hellman: |
| 218 | auto privateEcKey = JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL(Ec::tryGetEc(getEvpPkey()), InternalDOMOperationError, |
| 219 | "No elliptic curve data backing key", tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 220 | auto publicEcKey = |
| 221 | JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL(Ec::tryGetEc(publicKeyImpl.getEvpPkey()), InternalDOMOperationError, |
| 222 | "No elliptic curve data backing key", tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 223 | JSG_REQUIRE(publicEcKey.getPublicKey() != nullptr, DOMOperationError, |
| 224 | "No public elliptic curve key data in this key", tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 225 | auto fieldSize = privateEcKey.getDegree(); |
| 226 | |
| 227 | // Assuming that `fieldSize` will always be a sane value since it's related to the keys we |
| 228 | // construct in C++ (i.e. not untrusted user input). |
| 229 | |
| 230 | kj::Vector<kj::byte> sharedSecret; |
| 231 | sharedSecret.resize( |
| 232 | integerCeilDivision<std::make_unsigned_t<decltype(fieldSize)>>(fieldSize, 8u)); |
| 233 | auto written = ECDH_compute_key(sharedSecret.begin(), sharedSecret.capacity(), |
| 234 | publicEcKey.getPublicKey(), privateEcKey.getKey(), nullptr); |
| 235 | JSG_REQUIRE(written > 0, DOMOperationError, "Failed to generate shared ECDH secret", |
| 236 | tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 237 | |
| 238 | sharedSecret.resize(written); |
| 239 | |
| 240 | auto outputBitLength = resultBitLength.orDefault(sharedSecret.size() * 8); |
| 241 | JSG_REQUIRE(outputBitLength <= sharedSecret.size() * 8, DOMOperationError, |
| 242 | "Derived key length (", outputBitLength, " bits) is too long (should be at most ", |
| 243 | sharedSecret.size() * 8, " bits)."); |
| 244 | |
| 245 | // Round up since outputBitLength may not be a perfect multiple of 8. |
| 246 | // However, the last byte may now have bits that have leaked which we handle below. |
| 247 | auto resultByteLength = integerCeilDivision(outputBitLength, 8u); |
| 248 | sharedSecret.truncate(resultByteLength); |
| 249 | |
| 250 | // We have to remember to mask off the bits that weren't requested (if a non multiple of 8 was |
| 251 | // passed in). NOTE: The conformance tests DO NOT appear to test for this. This is my reading of |
| 252 | // the spec, combining: |
| 253 | // * ECDH: Return an octet string containing the first length bits of secret. |
| 254 | // * octet string: b is the octet string obtained by first appending zero or more bits of |
| 255 | // value zero to b such that the length of the resulting bit string is minimal |
| 256 | // and an integer multiple of 8. |
| 257 | auto numBitsToMaskOff = resultByteLength * 8 - outputBitLength; |
| 258 | KJ_DASSERT(numBitsToMaskOff < 8, numBitsToMaskOff); |
| 259 | |
| 260 | // The mask should have `numBitsToMaskOff` bits set to 0 from least significant to most. |
| 261 | // 0 = 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (0xFF) |
| 262 | // 1 = 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 (0xFE) |
| 263 | // 2 = 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 (0xFD) |
| 264 | // 3 = 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 (0xFC) |
| 265 | // Let's rewrite this to have the lower bits set to 1 since that's typically the easier form to |
| 266 | // generate with bit twiddling. |
| 267 | // 0 = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) |
| 268 | // 1 = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 (1) |
| 269 | // 2 = 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 (3) |
| 270 | // 3 = 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 (7) |
| 271 | // The pattern seems pretty clearly ~(2^n - 1) where n is the number of bits to mask off. Let's |
| 272 | // check the last one though (8 is not a possible boundary condition). |
| 273 | // (2^7 - 1) = 0x7f => ~0x7f = 0x80 (when truncated to a byte) |
| 274 | if (numBitsToMaskOff) { |
| 275 | uint8_t mask = ~((1 << numBitsToMaskOff) - 1); |
| 276 | sharedSecret.back() &= mask; |
| 277 | } |
| 278 | |
| 279 | return jsg::JsArrayBuffer::create(js, sharedSecret.asPtr()); |
| 280 | } |
| 281 | |
| 282 | jsg::JsArrayBuffer signatureSslToWebCrypto( |
| 283 | jsg::Lock& js, kj::ArrayPtr<kj::byte> signature) const override { |
| 284 | // An EC signature is two big integers "r" and "s". WebCrypto wants us to just concatenate both |
| 285 | // integers, using a constant size of each that depends on the curve size. OpenSSL wants to |
| 286 | // encode them in some ASN.1 wrapper with variable-width sizes. Ugh. |
| 287 | |
| 288 | requireSigningAbility(); |
| 289 | |
| 290 | // Manually decode ASN.1 BER. |
| 291 | KJ_ASSERT(signature.size() >= 6); |
| 292 | KJ_ASSERT(signature[0] == 0x30); |
| 293 | kj::ArrayPtr<const kj::byte> rest; |
| 294 | if (signature[1] < 128) { |
| 295 | KJ_ASSERT(signature[1] == signature.size() - 2); |
| 296 | rest = signature.slice(2, signature.size()); |
| 297 | } else { |
| 298 | // Size of message did not fit in 7 bits, so the first byte encodes the size-of-size, but it |
| 299 | // will always fit in 8 bits so the size-of-size will always be 1 (plus 128 because top bit |
| 300 | // is set). |
| 301 | KJ_ASSERT(signature[1] == 129); |
| 302 | KJ_ASSERT(signature[2] == signature.size() - 3); |
| 303 | rest = signature.slice(3, signature.size()); |
| 304 | } |
| 305 | |
| 306 | KJ_ASSERT(rest.size() >= 2); |
| 307 | KJ_ASSERT(rest[0] == 0x02); |
| 308 | size_t rSize = rest[1]; |
| 309 | KJ_ASSERT(rest.size() >= 2 + rSize); |
| 310 | auto r = rest.slice(2, 2 + rSize); |
| 311 | |
| 312 | rest = rest.slice(2 + rSize, rest.size()); |
| 313 | |
| 314 | KJ_ASSERT(rest.size() >= 2); |
| 315 | KJ_ASSERT(rest[0] == 0x02); |
| 316 | size_t sSize = rest[1]; |
| 317 | KJ_ASSERT(rest.size() == 2 + sSize); |
| 318 | auto s = rest.slice(2, 2 + sSize); |
| 319 | |
| 320 | // If the top bit is set, BER encoding will add an extra 0-byte prefix to disambiguate from a |
| 321 | // negative number. Uggghhh. |
| 322 | while (r.size() > rsSize && r[0] == 0) r = r.slice(1, r.size()); |
| 323 | while (s.size() > rsSize && s[0] == 0) s = s.slice(1, s.size()); |
| 324 | KJ_ASSERT(r.size() <= rsSize); |
| 325 | KJ_ASSERT(s.size() <= rsSize); |
| 326 | |
| 327 | // Construct WebCrypto format. |
| 328 | auto out = jsg::JsArrayBuffer::create(js, rsSize * 2); |
| 329 | auto outPtr = out.asArrayPtr(); |
| 330 | |
| 331 | // We're dealing with big-endian, so we have to align the copy to the right. This is exactly |
| 332 | // why big-endian is the wrong endian. |
| 333 | outPtr.slice(rsSize - r.size(), rsSize).copyFrom(r); |
| 334 | outPtr.slice(rsSize * 2 - s.size(), rsSize * 2).copyFrom(s); |
| 335 | return out; |
| 336 | } |
| 337 | |
| 338 | jsg::JsArrayBuffer signatureWebCryptoToSsl( |
| 339 | jsg::Lock& js, kj::ArrayPtr<const kj::byte> signature) const override { |
| 340 | requireSigningAbility(); |
| 341 | |
| 342 | if (signature.size() != rsSize * 2) { |
| 343 | // The signature is the wrong size. Return an empty signature, which will be judged invalid. |
| 344 | return jsg::JsArrayBuffer::create(js, 0); |
| 345 | } |
| 346 | |
| 347 | auto r = signature.first(rsSize); |
| 348 | auto s = signature.slice(rsSize, signature.size()); |
| 349 | |
| 350 | // Trim leading zeros. |
| 351 | while (r.size() > 1 && r[0] == 0) r = r.slice(1, r.size()); |
| 352 | while (s.size() > 1 && s[0] == 0) s = s.slice(1, s.size()); |
| 353 | |
| 354 | // If the most significant bit is set, we have to add a zero, ugh. |
| 355 | bool padR = r[0] >= 128; |
| 356 | bool padS = s[0] >= 128; |
| 357 | |
| 358 | size_t bodySize = 4 + padR + padS + r.size() + s.size(); |
| 359 | size_t resultSize = 2 + bodySize + (bodySize >= 128); |
| 360 | auto result = jsg::JsArrayBuffer::create(js, resultSize); |
| 361 | |
| 362 | kj::byte* pos = result.asArrayPtr().begin(); |
| 363 | *pos++ = 0x30; |
| 364 | if (bodySize < 128) { |
| 365 | *pos++ = bodySize; |
| 366 | } else { |
| 367 | *pos++ = 129; |
| 368 | *pos++ = bodySize; |
| 369 | } |
| 370 | |
| 371 | *pos++ = 0x02; |
| 372 | *pos++ = r.size() + padR; |
| 373 | if (padR) *pos++ = 0; |
| 374 | memcpy(pos, r.begin(), r.size()); |
| 375 | pos += r.size(); |
| 376 | |
| 377 | *pos++ = 0x02; |
| 378 | *pos++ = s.size() + padS; |
| 379 | if (padS) *pos++ = 0; |
| 380 | memcpy(pos, s.begin(), s.size()); |
| 381 | pos += s.size(); |
| 382 | |
| 383 | KJ_ASSERT(pos == result.asArrayPtr().end()); |
| 384 | |
| 385 | return result; |
| 386 | } |
| 387 | |
| 388 | static kj::OneOf<jsg::Ref<CryptoKey>, CryptoKeyPair> generateElliptic(jsg::Lock& js, |
| 389 | kj::StringPtr normalizedName, |
| 390 | SubtleCrypto::GenerateKeyAlgorithm&& algorithm, |
| 391 | bool extractable, |
| 392 | CryptoKeyUsageSet privateKeyUsages, |
| 393 | CryptoKeyUsageSet publicKeyUsages); |
| 394 | |
| 395 | kj::StringPtr jsgGetMemoryName() const override { |
| 396 | return "EllipticKey"; |
| 397 | } |
| 398 | size_t jsgGetMemorySelfSize() const override { |
| 399 | return sizeof(EllipticKey); |
| 400 | } |
| 401 | void jsgGetMemoryInfo(jsg::MemoryTracker& tracker) const override { |
| 402 | AsymmetricKeyCryptoKeyImpl::jsgGetMemoryInfo(tracker); |
| 403 | tracker.trackField("keyAlgorithm", keyAlgorithm); |
| 404 | } |
| 405 | |
| 406 | private: |
| 407 | SubtleCrypto::JsonWebKey exportJwk() const override final { |
| 408 | auto ec = JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL(Ec::tryGetEc(getEvpPkey()), DOMOperationError, |
| 409 | "No elliptic curve data backing key", tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 410 | return ec.toJwk(getTypeEnum(), kj::str(keyAlgorithm.namedCurve)); |
| 411 | } |
| 412 | |
| 413 | jsg::JsArrayBuffer exportRaw(jsg::Lock& js) const override final { |
| 414 | JSG_REQUIRE(getTypeEnum() == KeyType::PUBLIC, DOMInvalidAccessError, |
| 415 | "Raw export of elliptic curve keys is only allowed for public keys."); |
| 416 | return JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL(Ec::tryGetEc(getEvpPkey()), InternalDOMOperationError, |
| 417 | "No elliptic curve data backing key", tryDescribeOpensslErrors()) |
| 418 | .getRawPublicKey(js); |
| 419 | } |
| 420 | |
| 421 | CryptoKey::AsymmetricKeyDetails getAsymmetricKeyDetail(jsg::Lock& js) const override { |
| 422 | // Adapted from Node.js' GetEcKeyDetail |
| 423 | return KJ_ASSERT_NONNULL(Ec::tryGetEc(getEvpPkey())).getAsymmetricKeyDetail(js); |
| 424 | } |
| 425 | |
| 426 | CryptoKey::EllipticKeyAlgorithm keyAlgorithm; |
| 427 | uint rsSize; |
| 428 | }; |
| 429 | |
| 430 | struct EllipticCurveInfo { |
| 431 | kj::StringPtr normalizedName; |
| 432 | int opensslCurveId; |
| 433 | uint rsSize; // size of "r" and "s" in the signature |
| 434 | }; |
| 435 | |
| 436 | EllipticCurveInfo lookupEllipticCurve(kj::StringPtr curveName) { |
| 437 | static const std::map<kj::StringPtr, EllipticCurveInfo, CiLess> registeredCurves{ |
| 438 | {"P-256", {"P-256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 32}}, |
| 439 | {"P-384", {"P-384", NID_secp384r1, 48}}, |
| 440 | {"P-521", {"P-521", NID_secp521r1, 66}}, |
| 441 | }; |
| 442 | |
| 443 | auto iter = registeredCurves.find(curveName); |
| 444 | JSG_REQUIRE(iter != registeredCurves.end(), DOMNotSupportedError, |
| 445 | "Unrecognized or unimplemented EC curve \"", curveName, "\" requested."); |
| 446 | return iter->second; |
| 447 | } |
| 448 | |
| 449 | kj::OneOf<jsg::Ref<CryptoKey>, CryptoKeyPair> EllipticKey::generateElliptic(jsg::Lock& js, |
| 450 | kj::StringPtr normalizedName, |
| 451 | SubtleCrypto::GenerateKeyAlgorithm&& algorithm, |
| 452 | bool extractable, |
| 453 | CryptoKeyUsageSet privateKeyUsages, |
| 454 | CryptoKeyUsageSet publicKeyUsages) { |
| 455 | kj::StringPtr namedCurve = JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL( |
| 456 | algorithm.namedCurve, TypeError, "Missing field \"namedCurve\" in \"algorithm\"."); |
| 457 | |
| 458 | auto [normalizedNamedCurve, curveId, rsSize] = lookupEllipticCurve(namedCurve); |
| 459 | |
| 460 | auto keyAlgorithm = CryptoKey::EllipticKeyAlgorithm{ |
| 461 | normalizedName, |
| 462 | normalizedNamedCurve, |
| 463 | }; |
| 464 | |
| 465 | // Used OpenBSD man pages starting with https://man.openbsd.org/ECDSA_SIG_new.3 for functions and |
| 466 | // CryptoKey::Impl::generateRsa as a template. |
| 467 | // https://stackoverflow.com/questions/18155559/how-does-one-access-the-raw-ecdh-public-key-private-key-and-params-inside-opens |
| 468 | // for the reference on how to deserialize the public/private key. |
| 469 | |
| 470 | auto ecPrivateKey = |
| 471 | OSSLCALL_OWN(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(curveId), InternalDOMOperationError, |
| 472 | "Error generating EC \"", namedCurve, "\" key", internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 473 | OSSLCALL(EC_KEY_generate_key(ecPrivateKey)); |
| 474 | |
| 475 | auto privateEvpPKey = OSSL_NEW(EVP_PKEY); |
| 476 | OSSLCALL(EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(privateEvpPKey.get(), ecPrivateKey.get())); |
| 477 | |
| 478 | auto ecPublicKey = |
| 479 | OSSLCALL_OWN(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(curveId), InternalDOMOperationError, |
| 480 | "Error generating EC \"", namedCurve, "\" key", internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 481 | OSSLCALL(EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecPublicKey, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecPrivateKey))); |
| 482 | auto publicEvpPKey = OSSL_NEW(EVP_PKEY); |
| 483 | OSSLCALL(EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(publicEvpPKey.get(), ecPublicKey.get())); |
| 484 | |
| 485 | AsymmetricKeyData privateKeyData{ |
| 486 | .evpPkey = kj::mv(privateEvpPKey), |
| 487 | .keyType = KeyType::PRIVATE, |
| 488 | .usages = privateKeyUsages, |
| 489 | }; |
| 490 | AsymmetricKeyData publicKeyData{ |
| 491 | .evpPkey = kj::mv(publicEvpPKey), |
| 492 | .keyType = KeyType::PUBLIC, |
| 493 | .usages = publicKeyUsages, |
| 494 | }; |
| 495 | |
| 496 | auto privateKey = js.alloc<CryptoKey>( |
| 497 | kj::heap<EllipticKey>(kj::mv(privateKeyData), keyAlgorithm, rsSize, extractable)); |
| 498 | auto publicKey = |
| 499 | js.alloc<CryptoKey>(kj::heap<EllipticKey>(kj::mv(publicKeyData), keyAlgorithm, rsSize, true)); |
| 500 | |
| 501 | return CryptoKeyPair{.publicKey = kj::mv(publicKey), .privateKey = kj::mv(privateKey)}; |
| 502 | } |
| 503 | |
| 504 | AsymmetricKeyData importEllipticRaw(SubtleCrypto::ImportKeyData keyData, |
| 505 | int curveId, |
| 506 | kj::StringPtr normalizedName, |
| 507 | kj::ArrayPtr<const kj::String> keyUsages, |
| 508 | CryptoKeyUsageSet allowedUsages) { |
| 509 | // Import an elliptic key represented by raw data, only public keys are supported. |
| 510 | JSG_REQUIRE(keyData.is<kj::Array<kj::byte>>(), DOMDataError, |
| 511 | "Expected raw EC key but instead got a Json Web Key."); |
| 512 | |
| 513 | const auto& raw = keyData.get<kj::Array<kj::byte>>(); |
| 514 | |
| 515 | auto usages = CryptoKeyUsageSet::validate( |
| 516 | normalizedName, CryptoKeyUsageSet::Context::importPublic, keyUsages, allowedUsages); |
| 517 | |
| 518 | if (curveId == NID_ED25519 || curveId == NID_X25519) { |
| 519 | auto evpId = curveId == NID_X25519 ? EVP_PKEY_X25519 : EVP_PKEY_ED25519; |
| 520 | auto curveName = curveId == NID_X25519 ? "X25519" : "Ed25519"; |
| 521 | |
| 522 | JSG_REQUIRE(raw.size() == 32, DOMDataError, curveName, |
| 523 | " raw keys must be exactly 32-bytes " |
| 524 | "(provided ", |
| 525 | raw.size(), ")."); |
| 526 | |
| 527 | return { |
| 528 | OSSLCALL_OWN(EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(evpId, nullptr, raw.begin(), raw.size()), |
| 529 | InternalDOMOperationError, "Failed to import raw public EDDSA", raw.size(), |
| 530 | internalDescribeOpensslErrors()), |
| 531 | KeyType::PUBLIC, usages}; |
| 532 | } |
| 533 | |
| 534 | auto ecKey = OSSLCALL_OWN(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(curveId), DOMOperationError, |
| 535 | "Error importing EC key", tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 536 | auto ecGroup = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecKey.get()); |
| 537 | |
| 538 | auto point = OSSL_NEW(EC_POINT, ecGroup); |
| 539 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == EC_POINT_oct2point(ecGroup, point.get(), raw.begin(), raw.size(), nullptr), |
| 540 | DOMDataError, "Failed to import raw EC key data", tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 541 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecKey.get(), point.get()), InternalDOMOperationError, |
| 542 | "Failed to set EC raw public key", internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 543 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == EC_KEY_check_key(ecKey.get()), DOMDataError, "Invalid raw EC key provided", |
| 544 | tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 545 | |
| 546 | auto evpPkey = OSSL_NEW(EVP_PKEY); |
| 547 | OSSLCALL(EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(evpPkey.get(), ecKey.get())); |
| 548 | |
| 549 | return AsymmetricKeyData{kj::mv(evpPkey), KeyType::PUBLIC, usages}; |
| 550 | } |
| 551 | |
| 552 | kj::Own<EVP_PKEY> ellipticJwkReader( |
| 553 | int curveId, SubtleCrypto::JsonWebKey&& keyDataJwk, kj::StringPtr normalizedName) { |
| 554 | if (curveId == NID_ED25519 || curveId == NID_X25519) { |
| 555 | auto evpId = curveId == NID_X25519 ? EVP_PKEY_X25519 : EVP_PKEY_ED25519; |
| 556 | auto curveName = curveId == NID_X25519 ? "X25519" : "Ed25519"; |
| 557 | |
| 558 | JSG_REQUIRE(keyDataJwk.kty == "OKP", DOMDataError, curveName, |
| 559 | " \"jwk\" key imports requires a JSON Web Key with Key Type parameter " |
| 560 | "\"kty\" (\"", |
| 561 | keyDataJwk.kty, "\") equal to \"OKP\"."); |
| 562 | auto& crv = JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL( |
| 563 | keyDataJwk.crv, DOMDataError, "Missing field \"crv\" for ", curveName, " key."); |
| 564 | JSG_REQUIRE(crv == curveName, DOMNotSupportedError, "Only ", curveName, " is supported but \"", |
| 565 | crv, "\" was requested."); |
| 566 | KJ_IF_SOME(alg, keyDataJwk.alg) { |
| 567 | // If this JWK specifies an algorithm, make sure it jives with the hash we were passed via |
| 568 | // importKey(). |
| 569 | if (curveId == NID_ED25519) { |
| 570 | JSG_REQUIRE(alg == "EdDSA", DOMDataError, "JSON Web Key Algorithm parameter \"alg\" (\"", |
| 571 | alg, |
| 572 | "\") does not match requested " |
| 573 | "Ed25519 curve."); |
| 574 | } |
| 575 | } |
| 576 | |
| 577 | auto x = UNWRAP_JWK_BIGNUM(kj::mv(keyDataJwk.x), DOMDataError, "Invalid ", crv, |
| 578 | " key in JSON WebKey; missing or invalid public key component (\"x\")."); |
| 579 | JSG_REQUIRE(x.size() == 32, DOMDataError, "Invalid length ", x.size(), " for public key"); |
| 580 | |
| 581 | if (keyDataJwk.d == kj::none) { |
| 582 | // This is a public key. |
| 583 | return OSSLCALL_OWN(EVP_PKEY, |
| 584 | EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(evpId, nullptr, x.begin(), x.size()), |
| 585 | InternalDOMOperationError, "Failed to construct ", crv, " public key", |
| 586 | internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 587 | } |
| 588 | |
| 589 | // This is a private key. The Section 2 of the RFC says... |
| 590 | // > The parameter "x" MUST be present and contain the public key encoded using the base64url |
| 591 | // > [RFC4648] encoding. |
| 592 | // https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-cfrg-curves-06 |
| 593 | // ... but there's nothing really to do beside enforce that it's set? The NodeJS implementation |
| 594 | // seems to throw it away when a private key is provided. |
| 595 | |
| 596 | auto d = UNWRAP_JWK_BIGNUM(kj::mv(keyDataJwk.d), DOMDataError, "Invalid ", curveName, |
| 597 | " key in JSON Web Key; missing or invalid private key component (\"d\")."); |
| 598 | JSG_REQUIRE(d.size() == 32, DOMDataError, "Invalid length ", d.size(), " for private key"); |
| 599 | |
| 600 | return OSSLCALL_OWN(EVP_PKEY, EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(evpId, nullptr, d.begin(), d.size()), |
| 601 | InternalDOMOperationError, "Failed to construct ", crv, " private key", |
| 602 | internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 603 | } |
| 604 | |
| 605 | JSG_REQUIRE(keyDataJwk.kty == "EC", DOMDataError, |
| 606 | "Elliptic curve \"jwk\" key import requires a JSON Web Key with Key Type parameter " |
| 607 | "\"kty\" (\"", |
| 608 | keyDataJwk.kty, "\") equal to \"EC\"."); |
| 609 | |
| 610 | if (normalizedName == "ECDSA") { |
| 611 | KJ_IF_SOME(alg, keyDataJwk.alg) { |
| 612 | // If this JWK specifies an algorithm, make sure it jives with the hash we were passed via |
| 613 | // importKey(). |
| 614 | static const std::map<kj::StringPtr, int> ecdsaAlgorithms{ |
| 615 | {"ES256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1}, |
| 616 | {"ES384", NID_secp384r1}, |
| 617 | {"ES512", NID_secp521r1}, |
| 618 | }; |
| 619 | |
| 620 | auto iter = ecdsaAlgorithms.find(alg); |
| 621 | JSG_REQUIRE(iter != ecdsaAlgorithms.end(), DOMNotSupportedError, |
| 622 | "Unrecognized or unimplemented algorithm \"", alg, |
| 623 | "\" listed in JSON Web Key Algorithm parameter."); |
| 624 | |
| 625 | JSG_REQUIRE(iter->second == curveId, DOMDataError, |
| 626 | "JSON Web Key Algorithm parameter \"alg\" (\"", alg, |
| 627 | "\") does not match requested curve."); |
| 628 | } |
| 629 | } |
| 630 | |
| 631 | auto ecKey = OSSLCALL_OWN(EC_KEY, EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(curveId), DOMOperationError, |
| 632 | "Error importing EC key", tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 633 | |
| 634 | auto x = UNWRAP_JWK_BIGNUM( |
| 635 | kj::mv(keyDataJwk.x), DOMDataError, "Invalid EC key in JSON Web Key; missing \"x\"."); |
| 636 | auto y = UNWRAP_JWK_BIGNUM( |
| 637 | kj::mv(keyDataJwk.y), DOMDataError, "Invalid EC key in JSON Web Key; missing \"y\"."); |
| 638 | |
| 639 | auto group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecKey); |
| 640 | |
| 641 | auto bigX = JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL(toBignum(x), InternalDOMOperationError, "Error importing EC key", |
| 642 | internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 643 | auto bigY = JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL(toBignum(y), InternalDOMOperationError, "Error importing EC key", |
| 644 | internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 645 | |
| 646 | auto point = OSSL_NEW(EC_POINT, group); |
| 647 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, bigX, bigY, nullptr), |
| 648 | DOMOperationError, "Invalid EC key; public key coordinates \"x\" and \"y\" are invalid", |
| 649 | tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 650 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecKey, point), DOMOperationError, |
| 651 | "Invalid EC key; public key coordinates \"x\" and \"y\" are invalid", |
| 652 | tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 653 | |
| 654 | if (keyDataJwk.d != kj::none) { |
| 655 | // This is a private key. |
| 656 | |
| 657 | auto d = UNWRAP_JWK_BIGNUM(kj::mv(keyDataJwk.d), DOMDataError, |
| 658 | "Invalid EC key in JSON Web Key; missing or invalid private key component (\"d\")."); |
| 659 | |
| 660 | auto bigD = JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL(toBignum(d), InternalDOMOperationError, |
| 661 | "Error importing EC key", internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 662 | |
| 663 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == EC_KEY_set_private_key(ecKey, bigD), DOMOperationError, |
| 664 | "Invalid EC key; " |
| 665 | "private key component \"d\" is invalid", |
| 666 | tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 667 | } |
| 668 | |
| 669 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == EC_KEY_check_key(ecKey.get()), DOMDataError, "Invalid EC key in JSON Web Key", |
| 670 | tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 671 | |
| 672 | auto evpPkey = OSSL_NEW(EVP_PKEY); |
| 673 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(evpPkey.get(), ecKey.get()), DOMOperationError, |
| 674 | "Error importing EC key", tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 675 | return evpPkey; |
| 676 | } |
| 677 | } // namespace |
| 678 | |
| 679 | kj::OneOf<jsg::Ref<CryptoKey>, CryptoKeyPair> CryptoKey::Impl::generateEcdsa(jsg::Lock& js, |
| 680 | kj::StringPtr normalizedName, |
| 681 | SubtleCrypto::GenerateKeyAlgorithm&& algorithm, |
| 682 | bool extractable, |
| 683 | kj::ArrayPtr<const kj::String> keyUsages) { |
| 684 | auto usages = CryptoKeyUsageSet::validate(normalizedName, CryptoKeyUsageSet::Context::generate, |
| 685 | keyUsages, CryptoKeyUsageSet::sign() | CryptoKeyUsageSet::verify()); |
| 686 | auto privateKeyUsages = usages & CryptoKeyUsageSet::privateKeyMask(); |
| 687 | auto publicKeyUsages = usages & CryptoKeyUsageSet::publicKeyMask(); |
| 688 | |
| 689 | return EllipticKey::generateElliptic( |
| 690 | js, normalizedName, kj::mv(algorithm), extractable, privateKeyUsages, publicKeyUsages); |
| 691 | } |
| 692 | |
| 693 | kj::Own<CryptoKey::Impl> CryptoKey::Impl::importEcdsa(jsg::Lock& js, |
| 694 | kj::StringPtr normalizedName, |
| 695 | kj::StringPtr format, |
| 696 | SubtleCrypto::ImportKeyData keyData, |
| 697 | SubtleCrypto::ImportKeyAlgorithm&& algorithm, |
| 698 | bool extractable, |
| 699 | kj::ArrayPtr<const kj::String> keyUsages) { |
| 700 | kj::StringPtr namedCurve = JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL( |
| 701 | algorithm.namedCurve, TypeError, "Missing field \"namedCurve\" in \"algorithm\"."); |
| 702 | |
| 703 | auto [normalizedNamedCurve, curveId, rsSize] = lookupEllipticCurve(namedCurve); |
| 704 | |
| 705 | auto importedKey = [&, curveId = curveId] { |
| 706 | if (format != "raw") { |
| 707 | return importAsymmetricForWebCrypto(js, format, kj::mv(keyData), normalizedName, extractable, |
| 708 | keyUsages, |
| 709 | // Verbose lambda capture needed because: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=35984 |
| 710 | [curveId = curveId, normalizedName = kj::str(normalizedName)]( |
| 711 | SubtleCrypto::JsonWebKey keyDataJwk) -> kj::Own<EVP_PKEY> { |
| 712 | return ellipticJwkReader(curveId, kj::mv(keyDataJwk), normalizedName); |
| 713 | }, |
| 714 | CryptoKeyUsageSet::sign() | CryptoKeyUsageSet::verify()); |
| 715 | } else { |
| 716 | return importEllipticRaw( |
| 717 | kj::mv(keyData), curveId, normalizedName, keyUsages, CryptoKeyUsageSet::verify()); |
| 718 | } |
| 719 | }(); |
| 720 | |
| 721 | // get0 avoids adding a refcount... |
| 722 | auto ecKey = JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL(Ec::tryGetEc(importedKey.evpPkey.get()), DOMDataError, |
| 723 | "Input was not an EC key", tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 724 | |
| 725 | // Verify namedCurve matches what was specified in the key data. |
| 726 | JSG_REQUIRE(ecKey.getGroup() != nullptr && ecKey.getCurveName() == curveId, DOMDataError, |
| 727 | "\"algorithm.namedCurve\" \"", namedCurve, |
| 728 | "\" does not match the curve specified by the " |
| 729 | "input key data", |
| 730 | tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 731 | |
| 732 | auto keyAlgorithm = CryptoKey::EllipticKeyAlgorithm{ |
| 733 | normalizedName, |
| 734 | normalizedNamedCurve, |
| 735 | }; |
| 736 | |
| 737 | return kj::heap<EllipticKey>(kj::mv(importedKey), kj::mv(keyAlgorithm), rsSize, extractable); |
| 738 | } |
| 739 | |
| 740 | kj::OneOf<jsg::Ref<CryptoKey>, CryptoKeyPair> CryptoKey::Impl::generateEcdh(jsg::Lock& js, |
| 741 | kj::StringPtr normalizedName, |
| 742 | SubtleCrypto::GenerateKeyAlgorithm&& algorithm, |
| 743 | bool extractable, |
| 744 | kj::ArrayPtr<const kj::String> keyUsages) { |
| 745 | auto usages = CryptoKeyUsageSet::validate(normalizedName, CryptoKeyUsageSet::Context::generate, |
| 746 | keyUsages, CryptoKeyUsageSet::derivationKeyMask()); |
| 747 | return EllipticKey::generateElliptic( |
| 748 | js, normalizedName, kj::mv(algorithm), extractable, usages, {}); |
| 749 | } |
| 750 | |
| 751 | kj::Own<CryptoKey::Impl> CryptoKey::Impl::importEcdh(jsg::Lock& js, |
| 752 | kj::StringPtr normalizedName, |
| 753 | kj::StringPtr format, |
| 754 | SubtleCrypto::ImportKeyData keyData, |
| 755 | SubtleCrypto::ImportKeyAlgorithm&& algorithm, |
| 756 | bool extractable, |
| 757 | kj::ArrayPtr<const kj::String> keyUsages) { |
| 758 | kj::StringPtr namedCurve = JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL( |
| 759 | algorithm.namedCurve, TypeError, "Missing field \"namedCurve\" in \"algorithm\"."); |
| 760 | |
| 761 | auto [normalizedNamedCurve, curveId, rsSize] = lookupEllipticCurve(namedCurve); |
| 762 | |
| 763 | auto importedKey = [&, curveId = curveId] { |
| 764 | auto strictCrypto = FeatureFlags::get(js).getStrictCrypto(); |
| 765 | auto usageSet = strictCrypto ? CryptoKeyUsageSet() : CryptoKeyUsageSet::derivationKeyMask(); |
| 766 | |
| 767 | if (format != "raw") { |
| 768 | return importAsymmetricForWebCrypto(js, format, kj::mv(keyData), normalizedName, extractable, |
| 769 | keyUsages, |
| 770 | // Verbose lambda capture needed because: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=35984 |
| 771 | [curveId = curveId, normalizedName = kj::str(normalizedName)]( |
| 772 | SubtleCrypto::JsonWebKey keyDataJwk) -> kj::Own<EVP_PKEY> { |
| 773 | return ellipticJwkReader(curveId, kj::mv(keyDataJwk), normalizedName); |
| 774 | }, |
| 775 | CryptoKeyUsageSet::derivationKeyMask()); |
| 776 | } else { |
| 777 | // The usage set is required to be empty for public ECDH keys, including raw keys. |
| 778 | return importEllipticRaw(kj::mv(keyData), curveId, normalizedName, keyUsages, usageSet); |
| 779 | } |
| 780 | }(); |
| 781 | |
| 782 | auto ecKey = JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL(Ec::tryGetEc(importedKey.evpPkey.get()), DOMDataError, |
| 783 | "Input was not an EC public key nor a DH key", tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 784 | |
| 785 | // We ignore id-ecDH because BoringSSL doesn't implement this. |
| 786 | // https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=532728 |
| 787 | // https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=389400 |
| 788 | |
| 789 | // Verify namedCurve matches what was specified in the key data. |
| 790 | JSG_REQUIRE(ecKey.getGroup() != nullptr && ecKey.getCurveName() == curveId, DOMDataError, |
| 791 | "\"algorithm.namedCurve\" \"", namedCurve, |
| 792 | "\", does not match the curve " |
| 793 | "specified by the input key data", |
| 794 | tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 795 | |
| 796 | auto keyAlgorithm = CryptoKey::EllipticKeyAlgorithm{ |
| 797 | normalizedName, |
| 798 | normalizedNamedCurve, |
| 799 | }; |
| 800 | |
| 801 | return kj::heap<EllipticKey>(kj::mv(importedKey), kj::mv(keyAlgorithm), rsSize, extractable); |
| 802 | } |
| 803 | |
| 804 | // ===================================================================================== |
| 805 | // EDDSA & EDDH |
| 806 | |
| 807 | namespace { |
| 808 | |
| 809 | // Abstract base class for EDDSA and EDDH. The legacy NODE-ED25519 identifier for EDDSA has a |
| 810 | // namedCurve field whereas the algorithms in the Secure Curves spec do not. We handle this by |
| 811 | // keeping track of the algorithm identifier and returning an algorithm struct based on that. |
| 812 | class EdDsaKey final: public AsymmetricKeyCryptoKeyImpl { |
| 813 | public: |
| 814 | explicit EdDsaKey(AsymmetricKeyData keyData, kj::StringPtr keyAlgorithm, bool extractable) |
| 815 | : AsymmetricKeyCryptoKeyImpl(kj::mv(keyData), extractable), |
| 816 | keyAlgorithm(kj::mv(keyAlgorithm)) {} |
| 817 | |
| 818 | static kj::OneOf<jsg::Ref<CryptoKey>, CryptoKeyPair> generateKey(jsg::Lock& js, |
| 819 | kj::StringPtr normalizedName, |
| 820 | int nid, |
| 821 | CryptoKeyUsageSet privateKeyUsages, |
| 822 | CryptoKeyUsageSet publicKeyUsages, |
| 823 | bool extractablePrivateKey); |
| 824 | |
| 825 | CryptoKey::AlgorithmVariant getAlgorithm(jsg::Lock& js) const override { |
| 826 | // For legacy node-based keys with NODE-ED25519, algorithm contains a namedCurve field. |
| 827 | if (keyAlgorithm == "NODE-ED25519") { |
| 828 | return CryptoKey::EllipticKeyAlgorithm{ |
| 829 | keyAlgorithm, |
| 830 | keyAlgorithm, |
| 831 | }; |
| 832 | } else { |
| 833 | return CryptoKey::KeyAlgorithm{keyAlgorithm}; |
| 834 | } |
| 835 | } |
| 836 | |
| 837 | kj::StringPtr getAlgorithmName() const override { |
| 838 | return keyAlgorithm; |
| 839 | } |
| 840 | |
| 841 | kj::StringPtr chooseHash( |
| 842 | const kj::Maybe<kj::OneOf<kj::String, SubtleCrypto::HashAlgorithm>>& callTimeHash) |
| 843 | const override { |
| 844 | KJ_UNIMPLEMENTED(); |
| 845 | } |
| 846 | |
| 847 | jsg::JsArrayBuffer sign(jsg::Lock& js, |
| 848 | SubtleCrypto::SignAlgorithm&& algorithm, |
| 849 | kj::ArrayPtr<const kj::byte> data) const override { |
| 850 | JSG_REQUIRE(getTypeEnum() == KeyType::PRIVATE, DOMInvalidAccessError, |
| 851 | "Asymmetric signing requires a private key."); |
| 852 | |
| 853 | JSG_REQUIRE(getAlgorithmName() == "Ed25519" || getAlgorithmName() == "NODE-ED25519", |
| 854 | DOMOperationError, "Not implemented for algorithm \"", getAlgorithmName(), "\"."); |
| 855 | // Why NODE-ED25519? NodeJS uses NODE-ED25519/NODE-448 as algorithm names but that feels |
| 856 | // inconsistent with the broader WebCrypto standard. Filed an issue with the standard for |
| 857 | // clarification: https://github.com/tQsW/webcrypto-curve25519/issues/7 |
| 858 | |
| 859 | auto signature = jsg::JsArrayBuffer::create(js, ED25519_SIGNATURE_LEN); |
| 860 | size_t signatureLength = signature.size(); |
| 861 | |
| 862 | // NOTE: Even though there's a ED25519_sign/ED25519_verify methods, they don't actually seem to |
| 863 | // work or are intended for some other use-case. I tried adding the verify immediately after |
| 864 | // signing here & the verification failed. |
| 865 | auto digestCtx = OSSL_NEW(EVP_MD_CTX); |
| 866 | |
| 867 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == EVP_DigestSignInit(digestCtx.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, getEvpPkey()), |
| 868 | DOMOperationError, "Failed to initialize Ed25519 signing digest", |
| 869 | tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 870 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == |
| 871 | EVP_DigestSign(digestCtx.get(), signature.asArrayPtr().begin(), &signatureLength, |
| 872 | data.begin(), data.size()), |
| 873 | DOMOperationError, "Failed to sign with Ed25119 key", tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 874 | |
| 875 | JSG_REQUIRE(signatureLength == signature.size(), InternalDOMOperationError, |
| 876 | "Unexpected change in size signing Ed25519", signatureLength); |
| 877 | |
| 878 | return signature; |
| 879 | } |
| 880 | |
| 881 | bool verify(jsg::Lock& js, |
| 882 | SubtleCrypto::SignAlgorithm&& algorithm, |
| 883 | kj::ArrayPtr<const kj::byte> signature, |
| 884 | kj::ArrayPtr<const kj::byte> data) const override { |
| 885 | ClearErrorOnReturn clearErrorOnReturn; |
| 886 | |
| 887 | JSG_REQUIRE(getTypeEnum() == KeyType::PUBLIC, DOMInvalidAccessError, |
| 888 | "Asymmetric verification requires a public key."); |
| 889 | |
| 890 | JSG_REQUIRE(getAlgorithmName() == "Ed25519" || getAlgorithmName() == "NODE-ED25519", |
| 891 | DOMOperationError, "Not implemented for this algorithm", getAlgorithmName()); |
| 892 | |
| 893 | JSG_REQUIRE(signature.size() == ED25519_SIGNATURE_LEN, DOMOperationError, "Invalid ", |
| 894 | getAlgorithmName(), " signature length ", signature.size()); |
| 895 | |
| 896 | auto digestCtx = OSSL_NEW(EVP_MD_CTX); |
| 897 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == EVP_DigestSignInit(digestCtx.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, getEvpPkey()), |
| 898 | DOMOperationError, "Failed to initialize Ed25519 verification digest", |
| 899 | tryDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 900 | |
| 901 | auto result = EVP_DigestVerify( |
| 902 | digestCtx.get(), signature.begin(), signature.size(), data.begin(), data.size()); |
| 903 | |
| 904 | JSG_REQUIRE(result == 0 || result == 1, InternalDOMOperationError, "Unexpected return code", |
| 905 | result, internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 906 | |
| 907 | return !!result; |
| 908 | } |
| 909 | |
| 910 | jsg::JsArrayBuffer deriveBits(jsg::Lock& js, |
| 911 | SubtleCrypto::DeriveKeyAlgorithm&& algorithm, |
| 912 | kj::Maybe<uint32_t> resultBitLength) const override final { |
| 913 | JSG_REQUIRE(getAlgorithmName() == "X25519", DOMNotSupportedError, |
| 914 | "" |
| 915 | "The deriveBits operation is not implemented for \"", |
| 916 | getAlgorithmName(), "\"."); |
| 917 | |
| 918 | JSG_REQUIRE(getTypeEnum() == KeyType::PRIVATE, DOMInvalidAccessError, |
| 919 | "" |
| 920 | "The deriveBits operation is only valid for a private key, not \"", |
| 921 | getType(), "\"."); |
| 922 | |
| 923 | auto& publicKey = JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL( |
| 924 | algorithm.$public, TypeError, "Missing field \"public\" in \"derivedKeyParams\"."); |
| 925 | |
| 926 | JSG_REQUIRE(publicKey->getType() == "public"_kj, DOMInvalidAccessError, |
| 927 | "" |
| 928 | "The provided key has type \"", |
| 929 | publicKey->getType(), "\", not \"public\""); |
| 930 | |
| 931 | JSG_REQUIRE(getAlgorithm(js).which() == publicKey->getAlgorithm(js).which(), |
| 932 | DOMInvalidAccessError, "Base ", getAlgorithmName(), |
| 933 | " private key cannot be used to derive" |
| 934 | " a key from a peer ", |
| 935 | publicKey->getAlgorithmName(), " public key"); |
| 936 | |
| 937 | JSG_REQUIRE(getAlgorithmName() == publicKey->getAlgorithmName(), DOMInvalidAccessError, |
| 938 | "Private key for derivation is using \"", getAlgorithmName(), |
| 939 | "\" while public key is using \"", publicKey->getAlgorithmName(), "\"."); |
| 940 | |
| 941 | auto outputBitLength = resultBitLength.orDefault(X25519_SHARED_KEY_LEN * 8); |
| 942 | JSG_REQUIRE(outputBitLength <= X25519_SHARED_KEY_LEN * 8, DOMOperationError, |
| 943 | "Derived key length (", outputBitLength, " bits) is too long (should be at most ", |
| 944 | X25519_SHARED_KEY_LEN * 8, " bits)."); |
| 945 | |
| 946 | // The check above for the algorithm `which` equality ensures that the impl can be downcast to |
| 947 | // EdDsaKey (assuming we don't accidentally create a class that doesn't inherit this one that |
| 948 | // for some reason returns an EdDsaKey). |
| 949 | auto& publicKeyImpl = kj::downcast<EdDsaKey>(*publicKey->impl); |
| 950 | |
| 951 | // EDDH code derived from https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/EVP_PKEY_derive.html |
| 952 | auto ctx = OSSL_NEW(EVP_PKEY_CTX, getEvpPkey(), nullptr); |
| 953 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx), InternalDOMOperationError, |
| 954 | "Failed to init EDDH key derivation", internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 955 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, publicKeyImpl.getEvpPkey()), |
| 956 | InternalDOMOperationError, "Failed to set EDDH peer", internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 957 | |
| 958 | kj::Vector<kj::byte> sharedSecret; |
| 959 | sharedSecret.resize(X25519_SHARED_KEY_LEN); |
| 960 | size_t skeylen = X25519_SHARED_KEY_LEN; |
| 961 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, sharedSecret.begin(), &skeylen), DOMOperationError, |
| 962 | "Failed to derive EDDH key", internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 963 | KJ_ASSERT(skeylen == X25519_SHARED_KEY_LEN); |
| 964 | |
| 965 | // Check for all-zero value as mandated by spec |
| 966 | kj::byte isNonZeroSecret = 0; |
| 967 | for (kj::byte b: sharedSecret) { |
| 968 | isNonZeroSecret |= b; |
| 969 | } |
| 970 | JSG_REQUIRE(isNonZeroSecret, DOMOperationError, |
| 971 | "Detected small order secure curve points, aborting EDDH derivation"); |
| 972 | |
| 973 | // mask off bits like in ECDH's deriveBits() |
| 974 | auto resultByteLength = integerCeilDivision(outputBitLength, 8u); |
| 975 | sharedSecret.truncate(resultByteLength); |
| 976 | auto numBitsToMaskOff = resultByteLength * 8 - outputBitLength; |
| 977 | KJ_DASSERT(numBitsToMaskOff < 8, numBitsToMaskOff); |
| 978 | |
| 979 | if (numBitsToMaskOff) { |
| 980 | uint8_t mask = ~((1 << numBitsToMaskOff) - 1); |
| 981 | sharedSecret.back() &= mask; |
| 982 | } |
| 983 | |
| 984 | return jsg::JsArrayBuffer::create(js, sharedSecret.asPtr()); |
| 985 | } |
| 986 | |
| 987 | CryptoKey::AsymmetricKeyDetails getAsymmetricKeyDetail(jsg::Lock& js) const override { |
| 988 | // Node.js implementation for EdDsa keys currently does not provide any detail |
| 989 | return CryptoKey::AsymmetricKeyDetails{}; |
| 990 | } |
| 991 | |
| 992 | kj::StringPtr jsgGetMemoryName() const override { |
| 993 | return "EdDsaKey"; |
| 994 | } |
| 995 | size_t jsgGetMemorySelfSize() const override { |
| 996 | return sizeof(EdDsaKey); |
| 997 | } |
| 998 | void jsgGetMemoryInfo(jsg::MemoryTracker& tracker) const override { |
| 999 | AsymmetricKeyCryptoKeyImpl::jsgGetMemoryInfo(tracker); |
| 1000 | } |
| 1001 | |
| 1002 | private: |
| 1003 | kj::StringPtr keyAlgorithm; |
| 1004 | |
| 1005 | SubtleCrypto::JsonWebKey exportJwk() const override final { |
| 1006 | KJ_ASSERT(getAlgorithmName() == "X25519"_kj || getAlgorithmName() == "Ed25519"_kj || |
| 1007 | getAlgorithmName() == "NODE-ED25519"_kj); |
| 1008 | |
| 1009 | uint8_t rawPublicKey[ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]{}; |
| 1010 | size_t publicKeyLen = sizeof(rawPublicKey); |
| 1011 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(getEvpPkey(), rawPublicKey, &publicKeyLen), |
| 1012 | InternalDOMOperationError, "Failed to retrieve public key", |
| 1013 | internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 1014 | |
| 1015 | KJ_ASSERT(publicKeyLen == 32, publicKeyLen); |
| 1016 | |
| 1017 | SubtleCrypto::JsonWebKey jwk; |
| 1018 | jwk.kty = kj::str("OKP"); |
| 1019 | jwk.crv = kj::str(getAlgorithmName() == "X25519"_kj ? "X25519"_kj : "Ed25519"_kj); |
| 1020 | jwk.x = fastEncodeBase64Url(kj::arrayPtr(rawPublicKey, publicKeyLen)); |
| 1021 | if (getAlgorithmName() == "Ed25519"_kj) { |
| 1022 | jwk.alg = kj::str("EdDSA"); |
| 1023 | } |
| 1024 | |
| 1025 | if (getTypeEnum() == KeyType::PRIVATE) { |
| 1026 | // Deliberately use ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN here. |
| 1027 | // BoringSSL defines ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN as 64B since it stores the private key together |
| 1028 | // with public key data in some functions, but in the EVP interface only the 32B private key |
| 1029 | // itself is returned. |
| 1030 | uint8_t rawPrivateKey[ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]{}; |
| 1031 | size_t privateKeyLen = ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN; |
| 1032 | JSG_REQUIRE(1 == EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(getEvpPkey(), rawPrivateKey, &privateKeyLen), |
| 1033 | InternalDOMOperationError, "Failed to retrieve private key", |
| 1034 | internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 1035 | |
| 1036 | KJ_ASSERT(privateKeyLen == 32, privateKeyLen); |
| 1037 | |
| 1038 | jwk.d = fastEncodeBase64Url(kj::arrayPtr(rawPrivateKey, privateKeyLen)); |
| 1039 | OPENSSL_cleanse(rawPrivateKey, sizeof(rawPrivateKey)); |
| 1040 | } |
| 1041 | |
| 1042 | return jwk; |
| 1043 | } |
| 1044 | |
| 1045 | jsg::JsArrayBuffer exportRaw(jsg::Lock& js) const override final { |
| 1046 | JSG_REQUIRE(getTypeEnum() == KeyType::PUBLIC, DOMInvalidAccessError, "Raw export of ", |
| 1047 | getAlgorithmName(), " keys is only allowed for public keys."); |
| 1048 | |
| 1049 | auto raw = jsg::JsArrayBuffer::create(js, ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN); |
| 1050 | size_t exportedLength = raw.size(); |
| 1051 | |
| 1052 | JSG_REQUIRE( |
| 1053 | 1 == EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(getEvpPkey(), raw.asArrayPtr().begin(), &exportedLength), |
| 1054 | InternalDOMOperationError, "Failed to retrieve public key", |
| 1055 | internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 1056 | |
| 1057 | JSG_REQUIRE(exportedLength == raw.size(), InternalDOMOperationError, |
| 1058 | "Unexpected change in size", raw.size(), exportedLength); |
| 1059 | |
| 1060 | return raw; |
| 1061 | } |
| 1062 | }; |
| 1063 | |
| 1064 | template <size_t keySize, void (*KeypairInit)(uint8_t[keySize], uint8_t[keySize * 2])> |
| 1065 | CryptoKeyPair generateKeyImpl(jsg::Lock& js, |
| 1066 | kj::StringPtr normalizedName, |
| 1067 | int nid, |
| 1068 | CryptoKeyUsageSet privateKeyUsages, |
| 1069 | CryptoKeyUsageSet publicKeyUsages, |
| 1070 | bool extractablePrivateKey, |
| 1071 | kj::StringPtr curveName) { |
| 1072 | uint8_t rawPublicKey[keySize] = {0}; |
| 1073 | uint8_t rawPrivateKey[keySize * 2] = {0}; |
| 1074 | KeypairInit(rawPublicKey, rawPrivateKey); |
| 1075 | KJ_DEFER(OPENSSL_cleanse(rawPrivateKey, sizeof(rawPrivateKey))); |
| 1076 | |
| 1077 | // The private key technically also contains the public key. Why does the keypair function bother |
| 1078 | // writing out the public key to a separate buffer? |
| 1079 | |
| 1080 | auto privateEvpPKey = OSSLCALL_OWN(EVP_PKEY, |
| 1081 | EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(nid, nullptr, rawPrivateKey, keySize), InternalDOMOperationError, |
| 1082 | "Error constructing ", curveName, " private key", internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 1083 | |
| 1084 | auto publicEvpPKey = OSSLCALL_OWN(EVP_PKEY, |
| 1085 | EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(nid, nullptr, rawPublicKey, keySize), InternalDOMOperationError, |
| 1086 | "Internal error construct ", curveName, "public key", internalDescribeOpensslErrors()); |
| 1087 | |
| 1088 | AsymmetricKeyData privateKeyData{ |
| 1089 | .evpPkey = kj::mv(privateEvpPKey), |
| 1090 | .keyType = KeyType::PRIVATE, |
| 1091 | .usages = privateKeyUsages, |
| 1092 | }; |
| 1093 | AsymmetricKeyData publicKeyData{ |
| 1094 | .evpPkey = kj::mv(publicEvpPKey), |
| 1095 | .keyType = KeyType::PUBLIC, |
| 1096 | .usages = publicKeyUsages, |
| 1097 | }; |
| 1098 | |
| 1099 | auto privateKey = js.alloc<CryptoKey>( |
| 1100 | kj::heap<EdDsaKey>(kj::mv(privateKeyData), normalizedName, extractablePrivateKey)); |
| 1101 | auto publicKey = |
| 1102 | js.alloc<CryptoKey>(kj::heap<EdDsaKey>(kj::mv(publicKeyData), normalizedName, true)); |
| 1103 | |
| 1104 | return CryptoKeyPair{.publicKey = kj::mv(publicKey), .privateKey = kj::mv(privateKey)}; |
| 1105 | } |
| 1106 | |
| 1107 | kj::OneOf<jsg::Ref<CryptoKey>, CryptoKeyPair> EdDsaKey::generateKey(jsg::Lock& js, |
| 1108 | kj::StringPtr normalizedName, |
| 1109 | int nid, |
| 1110 | CryptoKeyUsageSet privateKeyUsages, |
| 1111 | CryptoKeyUsageSet publicKeyUsages, |
| 1112 | bool extractablePrivateKey) { |
| 1113 | switch (nid) { |
| 1114 | // BoringSSL doesn't support ED448/X448. |
| 1115 | case NID_ED25519: |
| 1116 | return generateKeyImpl<ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, ED25519_keypair>(js, normalizedName, nid, |
| 1117 | privateKeyUsages, publicKeyUsages, extractablePrivateKey, "Ed25519"_kj); |
| 1118 | case NID_X25519: |
| 1119 | return generateKeyImpl<X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN, X25519_keypair>(js, normalizedName, nid, |
| 1120 | privateKeyUsages, publicKeyUsages, extractablePrivateKey, "X25519"_kj); |
| 1121 | } |
| 1122 | |
| 1123 | KJ_FAIL_REQUIRE("ED ", normalizedName, " unimplemented", nid); |
| 1124 | } |
| 1125 | |
| 1126 | } // namespace |
| 1127 | |
| 1128 | kj::OneOf<jsg::Ref<CryptoKey>, CryptoKeyPair> CryptoKey::Impl::generateEddsa(jsg::Lock& js, |
| 1129 | kj::StringPtr normalizedName, |
| 1130 | SubtleCrypto::GenerateKeyAlgorithm&& algorithm, |
| 1131 | bool extractable, |
| 1132 | kj::ArrayPtr<const kj::String> keyUsages) { |
| 1133 | auto usages = |
| 1134 | CryptoKeyUsageSet::validate(normalizedName, CryptoKeyUsageSet::Context::generate, keyUsages, |
| 1135 | normalizedName == "X25519" ? CryptoKeyUsageSet::derivationKeyMask() |
| 1136 | : CryptoKeyUsageSet::sign() | CryptoKeyUsageSet::verify()); |
| 1137 | auto privateKeyUsages = usages & CryptoKeyUsageSet::privateKeyMask(); |
| 1138 | auto publicKeyUsages = usages & CryptoKeyUsageSet::publicKeyMask(); |
| 1139 | |
| 1140 | if (normalizedName == "NODE-ED25519") { |
| 1141 | kj::StringPtr namedCurve = JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL( |
| 1142 | algorithm.namedCurve, TypeError, "Missing field \"namedCurve\" in \"algorithm\"."); |
| 1143 | JSG_REQUIRE(namedCurve == "NODE-ED25519", DOMNotSupportedError, "EDDSA curve \"", namedCurve, |
| 1144 | "\" isn't supported."); |
| 1145 | } |
| 1146 | |
| 1147 | return EdDsaKey::generateKey(js, normalizedName, |
| 1148 | normalizedName == "X25519" ? NID_X25519 : NID_ED25519, privateKeyUsages, publicKeyUsages, |
| 1149 | extractable); |
| 1150 | } |
| 1151 | |
| 1152 | kj::Own<CryptoKey::Impl> CryptoKey::Impl::importEddsa(jsg::Lock& js, |
| 1153 | kj::StringPtr normalizedName, |
| 1154 | kj::StringPtr format, |
| 1155 | SubtleCrypto::ImportKeyData keyData, |
| 1156 | SubtleCrypto::ImportKeyAlgorithm&& algorithm, |
| 1157 | bool extractable, |
| 1158 | kj::ArrayPtr<const kj::String> keyUsages) { |
| 1159 | |
| 1160 | // BoringSSL doesn't support ED448. |
| 1161 | if (normalizedName == "NODE-ED25519") { |
| 1162 | // TODO: I prefer this style (declaring variables within the scope where they are needed) – |
| 1163 | // does KJ style want this to be done differently? |
| 1164 | kj::StringPtr namedCurve = JSG_REQUIRE_NONNULL( |
| 1165 | algorithm.namedCurve, TypeError, "Missing field \"namedCurve\" in \"algorithm\"."); |
| 1166 | JSG_REQUIRE(namedCurve == "NODE-ED25519", DOMNotSupportedError, "EDDSA curve \"", namedCurve, |
| 1167 | "\" isn't supported."); |
| 1168 | } |
| 1169 | |
| 1170 | auto importedKey = [&] { |
| 1171 | auto nid = normalizedName == "X25519" ? NID_X25519 : NID_ED25519; |
| 1172 | if (format != "raw") { |
| 1173 | return importAsymmetricForWebCrypto(js, format, kj::mv(keyData), normalizedName, extractable, |
| 1174 | keyUsages, |
| 1175 | [nid, normalizedName = kj::str(normalizedName)]( |
| 1176 | SubtleCrypto::JsonWebKey keyDataJwk) -> kj::Own<EVP_PKEY> { |
| 1177 | return ellipticJwkReader(nid, kj::mv(keyDataJwk), normalizedName); |
| 1178 | }, |
| 1179 | normalizedName == "X25519" ? CryptoKeyUsageSet::derivationKeyMask() |
| 1180 | : CryptoKeyUsageSet::sign() | CryptoKeyUsageSet::verify()); |
| 1181 | } else { |
| 1182 | return importEllipticRaw(kj::mv(keyData), nid, normalizedName, keyUsages, |
| 1183 | normalizedName == "X25519" ? CryptoKeyUsageSet() : CryptoKeyUsageSet::verify()); |
| 1184 | } |
| 1185 | }(); |
| 1186 | |
| 1187 | // In X25519 we ignore the id-X25519 identifier, as with id-ecDH above. |
| 1188 | return kj::heap<EdDsaKey>(kj::mv(importedKey), normalizedName, extractable); |
| 1189 | } |
| 1190 | |
| 1191 | kj::Own<CryptoKey::Impl> fromEcKey(kj::Own<EVP_PKEY> key) { |
| 1192 | auto nid = EVP_PKEY_id(key.get()); |
| 1193 | if (nid == NID_X25519 || nid == NID_ED25519) { |
| 1194 | return fromEd25519Key(kj::mv(key)); |
| 1195 | } |
| 1196 | |
| 1197 | // EVP_PKEY_id() returns the key type NID (e.g. EVP_PKEY_EC / "id-ecPublicKey"), not the curve |
| 1198 | // NID. We must extract the actual named curve from the EC key's group instead. |
| 1199 | auto ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(key.get()); |
| 1200 | KJ_ASSERT(ec != nullptr, "Expected an EC key"); |
| 1201 | auto group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); |
| 1202 | KJ_ASSERT(group != nullptr, "EC key has no group"); |
| 1203 | auto curveNid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group); |
| 1204 | |
| 1205 | // Prefer NIST names ("P-256", "P-384", "P-521") since that is what lookupEllipticCurve() |
| 1206 | // recognizes, falling back to the short OID name for other curves. |
| 1207 | auto curveName = EC_curve_nid2nist(curveNid); |
| 1208 | if (curveName == nullptr) { |
| 1209 | curveName = OBJ_nid2sn(curveNid); |
| 1210 | } |
| 1211 | if (curveName == nullptr) { |
| 1212 | curveName = "unknown"; |
| 1213 | } |
| 1214 | |
| 1215 | auto [normalizedNamedCurve, curveId, rsSize] = lookupEllipticCurve(curveName); |
| 1216 | |
| 1217 | return kj::heap<EllipticKey>( |
| 1218 | AsymmetricKeyData{ |
| 1219 | .evpPkey = kj::mv(key), |
| 1220 | .keyType = KeyType::PUBLIC, |
| 1221 | .usages = CryptoKeyUsageSet::verify(), |
| 1222 | }, |
| 1223 | CryptoKey::EllipticKeyAlgorithm{.name = "ECDSA"_kj, .namedCurve = normalizedNamedCurve}, |
| 1224 | rsSize, true); |
| 1225 | } |
| 1226 | |
| 1227 | kj::Own<CryptoKey::Impl> fromEd25519Key(kj::Own<EVP_PKEY> key) { |
| 1228 | return kj::heap<EdDsaKey>( |
| 1229 | AsymmetricKeyData{ |
| 1230 | .evpPkey = kj::mv(key), |
| 1231 | .keyType = KeyType::PUBLIC, |
| 1232 | .usages = CryptoKeyUsageSet::sign() | CryptoKeyUsageSet::verify(), |
| 1233 | }, |
| 1234 | "Ed25519"_kj, true); |
| 1235 | } |
| 1236 | } // namespace workerd::api |